McAfee has alerted me that the McAfee Secure Standard has been published on the McAfee Secure (formerly ScanAlert Hacker Safe) website.
The McAfee SECURE Standard
Joe Pierini and Kirk Lawrence started this process with me prior to their departure from McAfee, and work continued in their absence, largely at the hands of Will M., who's been communicative and inclusive in their stead.
I applaud McAfee for staying true to their commitment to publish the McAfee Secure Standard.
While I may not agree with everything in it, a standard is better than no standard.
That said, my concerns with the Standard as discussed earlier remain unaddressed.
First, you will find that remediation of what McAfee deftly refers to as Client Side Vulnerabilities is Optional. The Client Side Vulnerabilities category includes the entire family of script insertions.
Clarified, this means that merchants displaying the McAfee Secure trustmark are under no obligation to repair such vulnerabilities; the trustmark will remain displayed unabated by the truth.
My position here is clear.
If a website declaring itself secure via a McAfee Secure trustmark is vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS), I believe that declaration to be false and misleading. Further elaborated, the McAfee Secure Standard's Client Side Vulnerability category includes cross-site request forgery (CSRF).
While I choose not to out any site in particular at this time, I can assure you with all professional certainty that there are sites displaying a McAfee Secure trustmark that are vulnerable to CSRF. In the case of sites using one particular application, the CSRF vulnerability is so severe, an attacker can escalate privilege in short order.
This is a vulnerability that I've discovered and disclosed responsibly, so I won't discuss it further at this time.
But I ask you, should a site vulnerable to such an attack be labeled as McAfee Secure, per their freshly published Standard?
I think not.
Also Optional on the McAfee Secure Standard: SSL Encryption.
Should a website that conducts financial transactions, yet does not choose to encrypt transaction traffic, be allowed to display a McAfee Secure trustmark?
I think not.
Ironically, the McAfee Secure Standard directly compares itself to PCI DSS. None of the vulnerabilities listed as Optional, per the McAfee Secure Standard, are acceptable for PCI certification.
While the McAfee Secure Standard careful delineates the difference between the Secure trustmark program and their PCI Compliance program, it's not as black and white as they may think. McAfee is a PCI approved scanning vendor (ASV), and a provider of a popular PCI compliance service.
Should they really hold one set of customers to a different standard than the other?
I think not.
Again, I applaud McAfee for publishing the McAfee Secure Standard.
I never imagined we'd get this far, so I humbly ask McAfee to consider the following.
1) Don't bury the Standard. Announce it. Publicize it. Embrace discussion about it. Provide a link to it from the McAfee Secure website. While we may have differences over some of its content, the McAfee Secure Standard is a bold step. Let people know.
2) Disguising script insertions (XSS and CSRF) in the Client Side Vulnerabilities category is a disservice to your customers, and their customers. The "clients" in Client Side Vulnerabilities are consumers using these sites. I believe you are beholden to these consumers as much as you are your own.
Extend the timetable for merchant repair of these vulnerabilities if you must, but said repair should not be Optional.
3) A McAfee Secure site, with a McAfee Secure trustmark, without an SSL certificate is unfathomable. While many a vulnerability can be exploited under the umbrella of SSL protection, SSL encryption is nonetheless an industry standard that should not be Optional.
These things I ask of McAfee in the name of common sense and consumer well-being.
To quote the McAfee Secure website:
"When you display the McAfee Secure certification mark, you not only increase sales by increasing shopper confidence, you build your brand with the security seal seen on more top sites than any other."
Is "increasing confidence" at the expense of industry standards, and real web security a violation of good faith and the very trust you seek to build?
I think so.
As always, I welcome constructive and thoughtful comments and feedback.
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