Sunday, February 19, 2017

Toolsmith Release Advisory: Sysmon v6 for Securitay

Sysmon just keeps getting better.
I'm thrilled to mention that @markrussinovich and @mxatone have released Sysmon v6.
When I first discussed Sysmon v2 two years ago it offered users seven event types.
Oh, how it's grown in the last two years, now with 19 events, plus an error event.
From Mark's RSA presentation we see the current listing with the three new v6 events highlighted.
 
Sysmon Events

"This release of Sysmon, a background monitor that records activity to the event log for use in security incident detection and forensics, introduces an option that displays event schema, adds an event for Sysmon configuration changes, interprets and displays registry paths in their common format, and adds named pipe create and connection events."

Mark's presentation includes his basic event recommendations so as to run Sysmon optimally.
Basic Event Recommendations
Basic Event Recommendations (Cont)

I strongly suggest you deploy using these recommendations.
A great way to get started is to use a Sysmon configuration template. Again, as Mark discussed at RSA, consider @SwiftOnSecurity's sysmon-config-export.xml via Github. While there are a number of templates on Github, this one has "virtually every line commented and sections are marked with explanations, so it should also function as a tutorial for Sysmon and a guide to critical monitoring areas in Windows systems." Running Sysmon with it is as easy as:
sysmon.exe -accepteula -i sysmonconfig-export.xml

As a quick example of Sysmon capabilities and why you should always run it everywhere, consider the following driver installation scenario. While this is a non-malicious scenario that DFIR practitioners will appreciate, rather than the miscreants, the detection behavior resembles that which would result from kernel-based malware.
I fired up WinPMEM, the kernel mode driver for gaining access to physical memory included with Rekall, as follows:
WinPMEM
Upon navigating to Applications and Services Logs/Microsoft/Windows/Sysmon/Operational in the Windows Event Viewer, I retrieved the expected event:

Event ID 6: Driver loaded
The best way to leave you to scramble off and deploy Sysmon broadly, are with Mark's Best Practices and Tips, again from his RSA presentation.

Go forth and deploy!
Cheers...until next time.

Wednesday, February 08, 2017

Aikido & HolisticInfoSec™

This is the 300th post to the HolisticInfoSec™ blog. Sparta, this isn't, but I thought it important to provide you with content in a warrior/philosopher mindset regardless. 
Your author is an Aikido practitioner, albeit a fledgling in practice, with so, so much to learn. While Aikido is often translated as "the way of unifying with life energy" or as "the way of harmonious spirit", I propose that the philosophies and principles inherent to Aikido have significant bearing on the practice of information security.
In addition to spending time in the dojo, there are numerous reference books specific to Aikido from which a student can learn. Among the best is Adele Westbrook and Oscar Ratti's Aikido and the Dynamic Sphere. All quotes and references that follow are drawn from this fine publication.
As an advocate for the practice of HolisticInfoSec™ (so much so, I trademarked it) the connectivity to Aikido is practically rhetorical, but allow me to provide you some pointed examples. I've tried to connect each of these in what I believe is an appropriate sequence to further your understanding, and aid you in improving your practice. Simply, one could say each of these can lead to the next.
  
The Practice of Aikido
"The very first requisite for defense is to know the enemy."
So often in information security, we see reference to the much abused The Art of War, wherein Sun Tzu stated "It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles." Aikido embraces this as the first requisite, but so too offers the importance of not underestimating your enemy or opponent. For information security, I liken it to this. If you are uninformed on adversary actor types and profiles, their TTPs (tools, tactics, procedures), as well as current vulnerabilities and exploits, along with more general threat intelligence, then you are already at a disadvantage before you even begin to imagine countering your opponent.  

"A positive defensive strategy is further qualified as being specific, immediate, consistent, and powerful." 
Upon learning more about your adversary, a rehearsed, exercised strategy for responding to their attack should be considered the second requisite for defense. To achieve this, your efforts must include:
  • a clear definition and inventory of the assets you're protecting
  • threat modeling of code, services, and infrastructure
  • an incident response plan and SOP, and regular exercise of the IR plan
  • robust security monitoring to include collection, aggregation, detection, correlation, and visualization
  • ideally, a purple team approach that includes testing blue team detection and response capabilities in partnership with a red team. Any red team that follows the "you suck, we rock" approach should be removed from the building and replaced by one who espouses "we exist to identify vulnerabilities and exploits with the goal of helping the organization better mitigate and remediate".
As your detection and response capabilities improve with practice and repetition, your meantime to mitigate (MTM) and meantime to remediate (MTR) should begin to shrink, thus lending to the immediacy, consistentcy, and power of your defense.


The Process of Defense and Its Factors
"EVERY process of defense will consist of three stages: perception, evaluation-decision, and reaction."
These should be easy likenesses for you to reconcile.
Perception = detection and awareness
The better and more complete your threat intelligence collection and detection capabilities, the better your situational awareness will be, and as a result your perception of adversary behaviors will improve and become more timely.
Evaluation-decision = triage
It's inevitable...$#!+ happens. Your ability to quickly evaluate adversary actions and be decisive in your response will dictate your level of success as incident responders. Strength at this stage directly impacts the rest of the response process. Incorrect or incomplete evaluation, and the resulting ill-informed decisions, can set back your response process in a manner from which recovery will be very difficult.
Reaction = response
My Aikido sensei, after doing so, likes to remind his students "Don't get hit." :-) The analogy here is to react quickly enough to stay on your feet. Can you move quickly enough to not be hit as hard or as impactfully as your adversary intended? Your reaction and response will determine such outcomes. The connection between kinetic and virtual combat here is profound. Stand still, get hit. Feign or evade, at least avoid some, or all contact. In the digital realm, you're reducing your time to recover with this mindset.  

Dynamic Factors
"A defensive aikido strategy begins the moment a would-be attacker takes a step toward you or turns aggressively in your direction. His initial motion (movement) in itself contains the factors you will use to neutralize the action of attack which will spring with explosive force from that motion of convergence."
Continuing on our theme of inevitability, digital adversaries will, beyond the shadow of a doubt, take a step toward you or turn aggressively in your direction. The question for you will be, do you even know when that has occurred in light of our discussion of requisites above? Aikido is all about using your opponent's energy against them, wherein, for those of us in DFIR, our adversary's movement in itself contains the factors we use to neutralize the action of attack. As we improve our capabilities in our defensive processes (perception, evaluation-decision, and reaction), we should be able to respond in a manner that begins the very moment we identify adversarial behavior, and do so quickly enough that our actions pivot directly on our adversary's initial motion.
As an example, your adversary conducts a targeted, nuanced spear phishing campaign. Your detective means identify all intended victims, you immediately react, and add all intended victims to an enhanced watch list for continuous monitoring. The two victims who engaged the payload are quarantined immediately, and no further adversarial pivoting or escalation is identified. The environment as a whole raised to a state of heightened awareness, and your user-base becomes part of your perception network.


"It will be immediate or instantaneous when your reaction is so swift that you apply a technique of neutralization while the attack is still developing, and at the higher levels of the practice even before an attack has been fully launched."
Your threat intelligence capabilities are robust enough that your active deployment of detections for specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) prevented the targeted, nuanced spear phishing campaign from even reaching the intended victims. Your monitoring active lists include known adversary infrastructure such that the moment they launch an attack, you are already aware of its imminence.
You are able to neutralize your opponent before they even launch. This may be unimaginable for some, but it is achievable by certain mature organizations under specific circumstances.

The Principle of Centralization
"Centralization, therefore, means adopting a new point of reference, a new platform from which you can exercise a more objective form of control over events and over yourself."
Some organizations decentralize information security, others centralize it with absolute authority. There are arguments for both, and I do not intend to engage that debate. What I ask you to embrace is the "principle of centralization". The analogy is this: large corporations and organizations often have multiple, and even redundant security teams. Even so, their cooperation is key to success.
  • Is information exchanged openly and freely, with silos avoided? 
  • Are teams capable of joint response? 
  • Are there shared resources that all teams can draw from for consistent IOCs and case data?
  • Are you and your team focused on facts, avoiding FUD, thinking creatively, yet assessing with a critical, objective eye?
Even with a logically decentralized security model, organizations can embrace the principle of centralization and achieve an objective form of control over events. The practice of a joint forces focus defines the platform from which teams can and should operate.

Adversarial conditions, in both the physical realm, and the digital realm in which DFIR practitioners operate, are stressful, challenging, and worrisome. 
Morihei Ueshiba, Aikido's founder reminds us that "in extreme situations, the entire universe becomes our foe; at such critical times, unity of mind and technique is essential - do not let your heart waver!" That said, perfection is unlikely, or even impossible, this is a practice you must exercise. Again Ueshiba offers that "failure is the key to success; each mistake teaches us something."
Keep learning, be strong of heart. :-)
Cheers...until next time.

Saturday, December 31, 2016

The DFIR Hierarchy of Needs & Critical Security Controls

As you weigh how best to improve your organization's digital forensics and incident response (DFIR) capabilities heading into 2017, consider Matt Swann's Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs. Likely, at some point in your career (or therapy 😉) you've heard reference to Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. In summary, Maslow's terms,  physiological, safety, belongingness & love, esteem, self-actualization, and self-transcendence, describe a pattern that human motivations generally move through, a pattern that is well represented in the form of a pyramid.
Matt has made great use of this model to describe an Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs, through which your DFIR methods should move. I argue that his powerful description of capabilities extends to the whole of DFIR rather than response alone. From Matt's Github, "the Incident Response Hierarchy describes the capabilities that organizations must build to defend their business assets. Bottom capabilities are prerequisites for successful execution of the capabilities above them:"

The Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs
"The capabilities may also be organized into plateaus or phases that organizations may experience as they develop these capabilities:"

Hierarchy plateaus or phases
As visualizations, these representations really do speak for themselves, and I applaud Matt's fine work. I would like to propose that a body of references and controls may be of use to you in achieving this hierarchy to its utmost. I also welcome your feedback and contributions regarding how to achieve each of these needs and phases. Feel free to submit controls, tools, and tactics you have or would deploy to be successful in these endeavors; I'll post your submission along with your preferred social media handle.
Aspects of the Center for Internet Security Critical Security Controls Version 6.1 (CIS CSC) can be mapped to each of Matt's hierarchical entities and phases. Below I offer one control and one tool to support each entry. Note that there is a level of subjectivity to these mappings and tooling, but the intent is to help you adopt this thinking and achieve this agenda. Following is an example for each one, starting from the bottom of the pyramid.

 INVENTORY - Can you name the assets you are defending?  
Critical Security Control #1: Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
Family: System
Control: 1.4     
"Maintain an asset inventory of all systems connected to the network and the network devices themselves, recording at least the network addresses, machine name(s), purpose of each system, an asset owner responsible for each device, and the department associated with each device. The inventory should include every system that has an Internet protocol (IP) address on the network, including but not limited to desktops, laptops, servers, network equipment (routers, switches, firewalls, etc.), printers, storage area networks, Voice Over-IP telephones, multi-homed addresses, virtual addresses, etc.  The asset inventory created must also include data on whether the device is a portable and/or personal device. Devices such as mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and other portable electronic devices that store or process data must be identified, regardless of whether they are attached to the organization’s network." 
Tool option:
Spiceworks Inventory

 TELEMETRY - Do you have visibility across your assets?  
Critical Security Control #6: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs
Family: System
Control: 6.6      "Deploy a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) or log analytic tools for log aggregation and consolidation from multiple machines and for log correlation and analysis.  Using the SIEM tool, system administrators and security personnel should devise profiles of common events from given systems so that they can tune detection to focus on unusual activity, avoid false positives, more rapidly identify anomalies, and prevent overwhelming analysts with insignificant alerts."
Tool option:  
AlienVault OSSIM

 DETECTION - Can you detect unauthorized actvity? 
Critical Security Control #8: Malware Defenses
Family: System
Control: 8.1
"Employ automated tools to continuously monitor workstations, servers, and mobile devices with anti-virus, anti-spyware, personal firewalls, and host-based IPS functionality. All malware detection events should be sent to enterprise anti-malware administration tools and event log servers."
Tool option:
OSSEC Open Source HIDS SECurity

 TRIAGE - Can you accurately classify detection results? 
Critical Security Control #4: Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
Family: System
Control: 4.3
"Correlate event logs with information from vulnerability scans to fulfill two goals. First, personnel should verify that the activity of the regular vulnerability scanning tools is itself logged. Second, personnel should be able to correlate attack detection events with prior vulnerability scanning results to determine whether the given exploit was used against a target known to be vulnerable."
Tool option:
OpenVAS         

 THREATS - Who are your adversaries? What are their capabilities? 
Critical Security Control #19: Incident Response and Management
Family: Application
Control: 19.7
"Conduct periodic incident scenario sessions for personnel associated with the incident handling team to ensure that they understand current threats and risks, as well as their responsibilities in supporting the incident handling team."
Tool option:
Security Incident Response Testing To Meet Audit Requirements

 BEHAVIORS - Can you detect adversary activity within your environment? 
Critical Security Control #5: Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
Family: System
Control: 5.1
"Minimize administrative privileges and only use administrative accounts when they are required.  Implement focused auditing on the use of administrative privileged functions and monitor for anomalous behavior."
Tool option: 
Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)

 HUNT - Can you detect an adversary that is already embedded? 
Critical Security Control #6: Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs       
Family: System
Control: 6.4
"Have security personnel and/or system administrators run biweekly reports that identify anomalies in logs. They should then actively review the anomalies, documenting their findings."
Tool option:
GRR Rapid Response

 TRACK - During an intrusion, can you observe adversary activity in real time? 
Critical Security Control #12: Boundary Defense
Family: Network
Control: 12.10
"To help identify covert channels exfiltrating data through a firewall, configure the built-in firewall session tracking mechanisms included in many commercial firewalls to identify TCP sessions that last an unusually long time for the given organization and firewall device, alerting personnel about the source and destination addresses associated with these long sessions."
Tool option:
Bro

 ACT - Can you deploy countermeasures to evict and recover? 
Critical Security Control #20: Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises       
Family: Application
Control: 20.3
"Perform periodic Red Team exercises to test organizational readiness to identify and stop attacks or to respond quickly and effectively."
Tool option:
Red vs Blue - PowerSploit vs PowerForensics


 Can you collaborate with trusted parties to disrupt adversary campaigns? 
Critical Security Control #19: Incident Response and Management       
Family: Application
Control: 19.5
"Assemble and maintain information on third-party contact information to be used to report a security incident (e.g., maintain an e-mail address of security@organization.com or have a web page http://organization.com/security)."
Tool option:
MISP

I've mapped the hierarchy to the controls in CIS CSC 6.1 spreadsheet, again based on my experience and perspective, yours may differ, but consider similar activity.

CIS CSC with IR Hierarchy mappings


My full mapping of Matt's Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs in the
CIS CSC 6.1 spreadsheet is available here: http://bit.ly/CSC-IRH

I truly hope you familiarize yourself with Matt's Incident Response Hierarchy of Needs and find ways to implement, validate, and improve your capabilities accordingly. Consider that the controls and tools mentioned here are but a starting point and that you have many other options available to you. I look forward to hearing from you regarding your preferred tactics and tools as well. Kudos to Matt for framing this essential discussion so distinctly.

Sunday, December 11, 2016

Toolsmith - GSE Edition: Image Steganography & StegExpose

Cross-posted on the Internet Storm Center Diary.

Updated with contest winners 14 DEC. Congrats to:
Chrissy @SecAssistance
Owen Yang @HomingFromWork
Paul Craddy @pcraddy
Mason Pokladnik - Fellow STI grad
Elliot Harbin @klax0ff

In the last of a three part (Part 1-GCIH, Part 2-GCIA) series focused on tools I revisited during my GSE re-certification process, I thought it'd be timely and relevant to give you a bit of a walkthrough re: steganography tools. Steganography "represents the art and science of hiding information by embedding messages within other, seemingly harmless messages."
Stego has garnered quite a bit of attention again lately as party to both exploitation and exfiltration tactics. On 6 DEC 2016, ESET described millions of victims among readers of popular websites who had been targeted by the Stegano exploit kit hiding in pixels of malicious ads.
The Sucuri blog described credit card swipers in Magento sites on 17 OCT 2016, where attackers used image files as an obfuscation technique to hide stolen details from website owners, in images related to products sold on the victim website.

The GSE certification includes SANS 401 GSEC content, and Day 4 of the GSEC class content includes some time on steganography with the Image Steganography tool. Tools for steganographic creation are readily available, but a bit dated, including Image Steganography, last updated in 2011, and OpenStego, last updated in 2015. There are other older, command-line tools, but these two are really straightforward GUI-based options. Open source or free stego detection tools are unfortunately really dated and harder to find as a whole, unless you're a commercial tool user. StegExpose is one of a few open options that's fairly current (2015) and allows you to conduct steganalysis to detect LSB steganography in images. The LSB is the lowest significant bit in the byte value of the image pixel and LSB-based image steganography embeds the hidden payload in the least significant bits of pixel values of an image. 
Image Steganography uses LSB steganography, making this a perfect opportunity to pit one against the other.
Download Image Steganography from Codeplex, then run Image Steganography Setup.exe. Run Image Steganography after installation and select a PNG for your image. You can then type text you'd like to embed, or input data from a file. I chose wtf.png for my image, and rr.ps1 as my input file. I chose to write out the resulting stego sample to wtf2.png, as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Image Steganography
This process in reverse to decode a message is just as easy. Select the decode radio button, and the UI will switch to decode mode. I dragged the wtf2.png file I'd just created, and opted to write the ouput to the same directory, as seen in Figure 2.
Figure 2: wtf.png decoded

Pretty simple, and the extracted rr.ps1 file was unchanged from the original embedded file.
Now, will StegExpose detect this file as steganographic? Download StegExpose from Github, unpack master.zip, and navigate to the resulting directory from a command prompt. Run StegExpose.jar against the directory with your steganographic image as follows: java -jar StegExpose.jar c:\tmp\output. Sure enough, steganography confirmed as seen in Figure 3.
Figure 3: StegExpose
Not bad, right? Easy operations on both sides of the equation.

And now for a little contest. Five readers who email me via russ at holisticinfosec dot org and give me the most precise details regarding what I specifically hid in wtf2.png get a shout out here and $5 Starbucks gift cards for a little Christmastime caffeine.  

Contest: wtf2.png
Note: do not run the actual payload, it will annoy you to no end. If you must run it to decipher it, please do so in a VM. It's not malware, but again, it is annoying.

Cheers...until next time.

Sunday, November 27, 2016

Toolsmith - GSE Edition: Scapy vs CozyDuke

In continuation of observations from my GIAC Security Expert re-certification process, I'll focus here on a GCIA-centric topic: Scapy. Scapy is essential to the packet analyst skill set on so many levels. For your convenience, the Packetrix VM comes preconfigured with Scapy and Snort, so you're ready to go out of the gate if you'd like to follow along for a quick introduction.
Scapy is "a powerful interactive packet manipulation program. It is able to forge or decode packets of a wide number of protocols, send them on the wire, capture them, match requests and replies, and much more." This includes the ability to handle most tasks such as scanning, tracerouting, probing, unit tests, attacks or network discovery, thus replacing functionality expected from hping, 85% of nmap, arpspoof, tcpdump, and others.
If you'd really like to dig in, grab TJ O'Connor's  Violent Python: A Cookbook for Hackers, Forensic Analysts, Penetration Testers and Security Engineers (you should already have it), as first discussed here in January 2013. TJ loves him some Scapy: Detecting and Responding to Data Link Layer Attacks is another reference. :-)
You can also familiarize yourself with Scapy's syntax in short order with the SANS Scapy Cheat Sheet as well.
Judy Novak's SANS GIAC Certified Intrusion Analyst Day 5 content offers a nice set of walk-throughs using Scapy, and given that it is copyrighted and private material, I won't share them here, but will follow a similar path so you have something to play along with at home. We'll use a real-world APT scenario given recent and unprecedented Russian meddling in American politics. According to SC Magazine, "Russian government hackers apparently broke into the Democratic National Committee (DNC) computer systems" in infiltrations believed to be the work of two different Russian groups, namely Cozy Bear/ CozyDuke/APT 29 and Fancy Bear/Sofacy/APT 28, working separately. As is often the case, ironically and consistently, one the best overviews of CozyDuke behaviors comes via Kaspersky's Securelist. This article is cited as the reference in a number of Emerging Threats Snort/Suricata rules for CozyDuke. Among them, 2020962 - ET TROJAN CozyDuke APT HTTP Checkin, found in the trojan.rules file, serves as a fine exemplar.
I took serious liberties with the principles of these rules and oversimplified things significantly with a rule as added to my local.rules file on my Packetrix VM. I then took a few quick steps with Scapy to ensure that the rule would fire as expected. Of the IOCs derived from the Securelist article, we know a few things that, if built into a PCAP with Scapy, should cause the rule to fire when the PCAP is read via Snort.
  1. CozyDuke client to C2 calls were over HTTP
  2. Requests for C2 often included a .php reference, URLs included the likes of /ajax/index.php
  3. 209.200.83.43 was one of the C2 IPs, can be used as an example destination IP address
The resulting simpleton Snort rule appears in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Simple rule
To quickly craft a PCAP to trigger this rule, at a bash prompt, I ran scapy, followed by syn = IP(src="10.0.2.15", dst="209.200.83.43")/TCP(sport=1337, dport=80, flags="S")/"GET /ajax/index.php HTTP/1.1", then wrote the results out with wrpcap("/tmp/CozyDukeC2GET.pcap", syn), as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Simple Scapy
Then a quick run of the resulting file through Snort with snort -A console -q -K none -r /tmp/CozyDukeC2GET.pcap -c ../etc/snort.conf, and we have a hit as seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Simple result

Scapy is ridiculously powerful and is given no justice here, hopefully just enough information to entice you to explore further. With just the principles established here, you can see the likes of options to craft and manipulate with ls(TCP) and ls(IP).
 
Figure 4: ls()

If you're studying for the likes of GCIA or just looking to improve your understanding of TCP/IP and NSM, no better way to do so than with Scapy.
Cheers...until next time.

Monday, October 31, 2016

Toolsmith - GSE Edition: snapshot.ps1

I just spent a fair bit of time preparing to take the GIAC Security Expert exam as part of the requirement to recertify every four years. I first took the exam in 2012, and I will tell you, for me, one third of the curriculum is a "use it or lose it" scenario. The GSE exam covers GSEC, GCIH, and GCIA. As my daily duties have migrated over the years from analyst to leadership, I had to "relearn" my packet analysis fu. Thank goodness for the Packetrix VM and the SANS 503 exercises workbook, offsets, flags, and fragments, oh my! All went well, mission accomplished, I'm renewed through October 2020 and still GSE #52, but spending weeks with my nose in the 18 course books reminded of some of the great tools described therein. As a result, this is the first of a series on some of those tools, their value, and use case scenarios.
I'll begin with snapshot.ps1. It's actually part of the download package for SEC505: Securing Windows and PowerShell Automation, but is discussed as part of the GCIH curriculum. In essence, snapshot.ps1 represents one script to encapsulate activities specific to the SANS Intrusion Discovery Cheat Sheet for Windows.
The script comes courtesy of Jason Fossen, the SEC505 author, and can be found in the Day 5-IPSec folder of the course download package. The script "dumps a vast amount of configuration data for the sake of auditing and forensics analysis" and allows you to "compare snapshot files created at different times to extract differences."
To use snapshot.ps1 place the script into a directory where it is safe to create a subdirectory as the script creates such a directory named named for the computer, then writes a variety of files containing system configuration data.  Run snapshot.ps1 with administrative privileges.
The script runs on Windows 7, Server 2008, and newer Windows operating systems (I ran it on Windows 10 Redstone 2) and requires PowerShell 3.0 or later. You also need to have autorunsc.exe and sha256deep.exe in your PATH if you want to dump what programs are configured to startup automatically when your system boots and you login, as well as run SHA256 file hashes.
That said, if you must make the script run faster, and I mean A LOT FASTER, leave file
hashing disabled at the end of the snapshot.ps1 for a 90% reduction in run time. 
However, Jason points out that this is one of the most useful aspects of the script for identifying adversarial activity. He also points out that snapshot.ps1 is a starter script; you can and should add more commands. As an example, referring back to toolsmith #112: Red vs Blue - PowerSploit vs PowerForensics, after importing PowerForensics, you could add something like Get-ForensicTimeline | Sort-Object -Property Date | Where-Object { $_.Date -ge "12/30/2015" -and $_.Date -le "01/04/2016" } | WriteOut -FileName Timeline which would give you a file system timeline between the 12/30/2015 and 01/04/2016.But wait, there's more! Want to get autoruns without needing autorunsc.exe?  Download @p0w3rsh3ll's AutoRuns module, run Import-Module AutoRuns.psm1, then Get-Command -Module AutoRuns to be sure the module is on board, and finally comment out autorunsc.exe -accepteula -a -c | Out-File -FilePath AutoRuns.csv then add Get-PSAutorun | WriteOut -FileName AutoRuns.
It's then as simple as running .\Snapshot.ps1 and watch your computer-named directory populate, 0V3RW4TCH-2016-10-31-9-7 in my case, per Figure 1.

Figure 1: Snapshot.ps1 run
Most result files are written in machine-readable XML, CSV, and TXT, as well as REG files generated by the registry exports via reg.exe.
A great example of a results file, is spawned via dir -Path c:\ -Hidden -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | Select-Object FullName,Length,Mode,CreationTime,LastAccessTime,LastWriteTime | Export-Csv -Path FileSystem-Hidden-Files.csv. The resulting CSV is like a journey down evil memory lane, where all the nuggets I've tested in the past leave artifacts. This would be EXACTLY what you would be looking for under real response scenarios, as seen in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Snapshot.ps1 grabs hidden files
Sure, there are bunches of related DFIR collection scripts, but I really like this one, and plan to tweak it further. Good work from Jason, and just one of many reasons to consider taking SEC505, or pursuing your GSE!
Cheers...until next time.

Saturday, October 08, 2016

Toolsmith Release Advisory: Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) 2.4.52

7 OCT 2016 saw the release of MISP 2.4.52.
MISP, Malware Information Sharing Platform and Threat Sharing, is free and open source software to aid in sharing of threat and cyber security indicators.
An overview of MISP as derived from the project home page:
  • Automation:  Store IOCs in a structured manner, and benefit from correlation, automated exports for IDS, or SIEM, in STIX or OpenIOC and even to other MISPs.
  • Simplicity: the driving force behind the project. Storing and using information about threats and malware should not be difficult. MISP allows getting the maximum out of your data without unmanageable complexity.
  • Sharing: the key to fast and effective detection of attacks. Often organizations are targeted by the same Threat Actor, in the same or different Campaign. MISP makes it easier to share with and receive from trusted partners and trust-groups. Sharing also enables collaborative analysis, preventing redundant work.
The MISP 2.4.52 release includes the following new features:
  • Freetext feed import: a flexible scheme to import any feed available on Internet and incorporate them automatically in MISP. The feed imported can create new event or update an existing event. The freetext feed feature permits to preview the import and quickly integrates external sources.
  • Bro NIDS export added in MISP in addition to Snort and Suricata.
  • A default role can be set allowing flexible role policy.
  • Functionality to allow merging of attributes from a different event.
  • Many updates and improvement in the MISP user-interface including filtering of proposals at index level.
Bug fixes and improvements include:
  • XML STIX export has been significantly improved to ensure enhanced compatibility with other platforms.
  • Bruteforce protection has been fixed.
  • OpenIOC export via the API is now possible.
  • Various bugs at the API level were fixed.
This is an outstanding project that will be the topic of my next Toolsmith In-depth Analysis.

Cheers...until next time.