MORPHINATOR & cyber maneuver as a defensive tactic

In June I read an outstanding paper from MAJ Scott Applegate, US Army, entitled The Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations, written as part of his work at George Mason University.
Then yesterday, I spotted a headline indicating that US Army has awarded a contract to Raytheon to develop technology for Morphing Network Assets to Restrict Adversarial Reconnaissance, or MORPHINATOR.
Aside from what might be the greatest acronym of all time (take that, APT) MORPHINATOR represents a defensive tactic well worthy of consideration in the private sector as well. While the Raytheon article is basically just a press release, I strongly advocate your reading MAJ Applegate's paper at earliest convenience. I will restate the principles for you here in the understanding that these are, for me, the highlights of this excellent research, as you might consider them for private sector use, and are to be entirely attributed to MAJ Applegate.
First, understand that the United States Military describes the concept of maneuver as "the disposition of forces to conduct operations by securing positional advantages before and or during combat operations."
MAJ Applegate proposes that the principles of maneuver as defined above require a significant amount of rethinking when applied to the virtual realm that constitutes cyberspace. "The methods and processes employed to attack and defend information resources in cyberspace constitute maneuver as they are undertaken to give one actor a competitive advantage over another."
While cyber maneuver as described in this paper include elements of offensive and defensive tactics, I think it most reasonable to explore defensive tactics as the primary mission when applied to the private sector.
While I privately and cautiously advocate active defense (offensive reaction to an attack) I'm not aware of too many corporate entities who readily embrace direct or overt offensive tactics.
The paper indicates that: "Cyber maneuver leverages positioning in the cyberspace domain to disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy, or manipulate computing and information resources. It is used to apply force, deny operation of or gain access to key information stores or strategically valuable systems." While this reads as a more offense-oriented statement, carry forward disrupt, deny, degrade, and manipulate to a defensive mindset.
Applying parts of MAJ Applegate's characteristics of cyber maneuver to defensive tactics would include speed, operational reach, dynamic evolution, rapid concentration, non-serial and distributed. Consider these in the context of private sector networks while reviewing direct quotes from the paper as such.

• Speed: "Actions in cyberspace can be virtually instantaneous, happening at machine speeds."
• Operational Reach: "Reach in cyber operations tends to be limited by the scale of maneuver and the ability of an element to shield its actions from enemy observation, detection and reaction."
• Dynamic evolution: "Recent years have seen rise to heavy use of web based applications, cloud computing, smart phones, and converging technologies. This ongoing evolution leads to constant changes in tactics, techniques and procedures used by both attackers and defenders in cyberspace."
• Non-serial and distributed: "Maneuver in cyberspace allows attackers and defenders to simultaneously conduct actions across multiple systems at multiple levels of warfare. For defenders, this can mean hardening multiple systems simultaneously when new threats are discovered, killing multiple access points during attacks, collecting and correlating data from multiple sensors in parallel or other defensive actions."

Incorporating the above characteristics as part of defensive tactics for the private sector does not negate the need to fully understand and defend against the additional characteristics found in the research including access & control, stealth & limited attribution, and rapid concentration. Liken access & control here to a "forward base" concept allowing attackers "to move the point of attack forward." Stealth & limited attribution clarifies that while action in cyberspace is "observable" most actions are not observed in a meaningful way." Think of this, in all seriousness as "what you don't know will kill you." Rapid concentration represents the mass effect of botnets and DDoS attacks and the ease with which they're deployed in cyberspace. As defenders we must be entirely cognitive of these elements and ensure agility in our response to the threats they represent.

Now to close the loop (analogy intended, see the paper's reference to an OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) loop) as it pertains to defensive tactics. The Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations offers four Basic Forms of Defensive Cyber Maneuver, three of which directly apply to private sector network operations.

1. Perimeter Defense & Defense in Depth: Well known, well discussed, but not always well-done. "While defense in depth is a more effective strategy than a line defense, both these defensive formations suffer from the fact that they are fixed targets with relatively static defenses which an enemy can spend time and resources probing for vulnerabilities with little or no threat of retaliation."
2. Moving Target Defense: "This form of defensive maneuver uses technical mechanisms to constantly shift certain aspects of targeted systems to make it much more difficult for an attacker to be able to identify, target and successfully attack a target." This can be system level address space layout randomization (ASLR) or constantly moving virtual resources in cloud-based infrastructure.
3. Deceptive Defense: "The use use of these types of (honeypots) systems can allow a defender to regain the initiative by stalling an attack, giving the defender time to gather information on the attack methodology and then adjusting other defensive systems to account for the attacker’s tactics, techniques and procedures."

Drawing from part of MAJ Applegate's conclusion, when considering the principles described herein, "while maneuver in cyberspace is uniquely different than its kinetic counterparts, its objective remains the same, to gain a position of advantage over a competitor and to leverage that position for decisive success. It is therefore important to continue to study and define the evolving principle of maneuver in cyberspace to ensure the success of operations in this new warfighting domain."
I contend this is not a war pending, but a war upon us.
 While The Principle of Maneuver in Cyber Operations discusses this declaration specific to military operations, we are well advised to consider this precision of message in the private sector. GEN Keith Alexander, U.S. Cyber Command chief and the director of the National Security Agency, was recently quoted as saying that the loss of intellectual property due to cyber attacks amounts to the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history.” GEN Alexander went on to say "What I’m concerned about is the transition from disruptive to destructive attacks and I think that’s coming. We have to be ready for that."
Private sector and military resources alike need to think in these terms and act decisively. Cyber maneuver tactics offer intriguing options to be certain.
Use MAJ Applegate's fine work as reference material to perpetuate this conversation, and may the MORPHINATOR be with you.