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Showing posts from 2009

Russ = Rogueware: Is nothing sacred?

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You know you've hit the big time when...;-)
Alright, maybe not, but you still may have to step aside for my ego.
Wait, you already have to do that.
Fine. Never mind.
But this is kinda funny.

Full disclosure:
I use Google Alerts for my name (Russ McRee) and my domain (holisticinfosec).
I'll be quite honest and tell you that it's a combination of ego and paranoia.
I want to know when people say nice things (rare), when they talk smack (more likely), or when they're illegally reusing content (a constant).

Ok, so now you know I auto-Google myself (you should too), but here's where it gets new and exciting.



See the first entry above, i.e. "Russ"?
No good news there.
Looks like keyword abuse or a compromised site pointing to rogueware/scareware:
hxxp://www.tuckmall.com.tw/blog.php?blog=russ+mcree



Use caution as always if you choose to go there, fellow bug analysts.
MMPC calls the binary Trojan:Win32/Winwebsec.
The VirusTotal results include 10 detections out of 41 possible.

The…

Maltego is the 2009 Toolsmith Tool of the Year

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Maltego: transform and correlate

December 2009's edition of the ISSA Journal's toolsmith discusses Maltego at length with specific attention to transforming RFI and scareware attributes.
Maltego is an open source intelligence and forensics application.
While researching and writing for December's article I fell completely for this tool.
It was a difficult decision having covered some brilliant and remarkable tools in 2009, but only one can come out on top.

The 2009 Toolsmith Tool of the Year is Maltego.
Congratulations to Andrew MacPherson and his team.

As an example, I used Maltego to analyze remote file include (RFI) attacks against my website and found it to be an extraordinary addition to my toolkit.
RFI attack URL strings often end with a common script name with a .txt or .gif extension.
I grabbed five such file names as most often seen in my logs from October:
zfxid1.txt
id1.txt
fx29id1.txt
idxx.txt
crespon1.txt
fxid1.txt
I fed these to Maltego and one of the URLS revealed showe…

REI: vulnerability remediation done wrong

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Part 2 of 2 of Vulnerability remediation done *

It makes me sad to use REI as another example of the wrong way to manage vulnerability disclosure; I am a member who is fond of their stores and products. I will not name names or blather on about negligence.
Rather, I will let the facts simply speak for themselves.

1) On April 11th, 2008 (more than a year and a half ago), I reported a cross-site scripting vulnerability specific to the REI website search functionality. Via email I received a reply indicating that "I’ll have our team evaluate this." I had every reason to believe it would be resolved.

2) The issue completely fell off my radar thereafter until one evening I was checking old findings and noticed that the vulnerability remained on October 1, 2009.

3) Surprised, if not shocked, I tried an alternative approach. I called REI HQ and asked to speak with an appropriate party to report the issue again. I was transferred to a person who provided me with an email alias to which …

Pligg pluggs holes: vulnerability remediation done right

Part 1 of 2 of Vulnerability remediation done *

Often, when I disclose web application vulnerabilities to Secunia, who in turn works with vendors to drive mitigation and remediation, we are met with vendors who don't reply, don't care, or don't fix.
Yet, once in a rare while a vendor chooses the righteous path.
Such is the case with Pligg.
Pligg posted a detailed, transparent, candid writeup regarding the disclosure and their response prior to the scheduled release date (12/2/09) for the advisory. In addition their new release (1.0.3) addressing the issues in now available.
As I am too often prone to complaining, I relish the opportunity to say "well done."
To Pligg, a hearty thank you; you are now amongst the standard bearing few who swiftly address vulnerabilities, do so with candor and transparency, and care about your user base.
When the advisories go live as scheduled tomorrow they will be found here and here.
Again to Pligg: well done.

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Fun with fake Flash: an Abode update you don't want

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Jericho of Attrition.org (support the Open Security Foundation!) recently asked the VIM mailing list a question: Adobe Flash - vuln or just "design"?
The question, inspired by Mike Bailey's work for Foreground Security, leads to healthy debate, including press and vendor response. But, ironically the same day I received the VIM mail, I was led to explore a slightly different perspective on Adobe Flash issues. Thus, your author doesn't intend to get in the middle of above proposed curmudgeonly discussion.

I am however inspired to be curmudgeonly; grumpy even.

The crux of this conversation is the fact that the oft updated Adobe Flash Player continuously proves to be social engineering attack vector fodder. This is by no means news, or likely a surprise to the 19 of you who read this blog, but I recently stumbled on a real gem in the wild and I thought I'd share.
Whilst defending the Intarwebs from evildoers, I spotted
hxxp://www.abodeplugin.com/flashpayer/thankyou/fla…

Whitepaper Review - Preventing Security Development Errors: Lessons Learned at Windows Live by Using ASP.NET MVC

As part of a security team that cares deeply about the well being of Windows Live, I was extremely pleased to review a paper written by web application security specialists for whom I have deep respect.
Preventing Security Development Errors: Lessons Learned at Windows Live by Using ASP.NET MVC was written by a powerhouse team whose talent speaks for itself, including Casaba's Chris Weber; his Watcher was discussed in November'stoolsmith.

First, I am an unabashed SDL fanboy. Any work that accentuates SDL principles is off to a great start in my book: security by default being paramount.
Second, of this paper's three subtopics (CSRF, open redirects, JSON hijacking), two (CSRF, open redirects) consistently count as pet peeves for me.
As for JSON hijacking, the best explanation available is also offered by one of the paper's authors, Phil Haack: JSON Hijacking.

"ASP.NET MVC provides a new Model-View-Controller framework on top of the existing ASP.NET 3.5 runtime. This fra…

Pending book review: ModSecurity 2.5

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Packt Publishing, a UK based publishing firm specializing in focused IT books, has asked me to review Magnus Mischel's ModSecurity 2.5.


Having recently discussed monitoring ModSecurity with OSSEC, I'm looking forward to reading this book.
I've been a ModSecurity fan since incorporating it in a secure server implementation, back when it was version 1.9.4 in 2006, as part of a paper written for OWASP.

Expected highlights include:
* Securing your system by knowing exactly how a hacker would break into it
* Writing rules in-depth and ModSecurity rule language elements such as variables, actions, and request phases
* Covers the common attacks in use on the Web; find the geographical location of an attacker and send alert emails when attacks are discovered
* Many real-life examples for better understanding

I'll give you a detailed, honest assessment of ModSecurity 2.5 in a few weeks.

Cheers.

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Sucuri NBIM: website integrity monitoring for free

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Here's a nice freebie you might like as part of your website monitoring arsenal.
I signed up with Sucuri for their NBIM (network based integrity monitoring) service to help keep an eye on holisticinfosec.org, and have been very satisfied with this free offering (sometimes you get more than what you pay for).
As an example, when my hosting provider updates the server, I know immediately via email.

EXAMPLE:

Modifications:
5,6c5,6
< Server: Apache/2.2.13 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.13 OpenSSL/0.9.8k DAV/2 mod_auth_passthrough/2.1 FrontPage/5.0.2.2635
< X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.9
---
> Server: Apache/2.2.14 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.2.14 OpenSSL/0.9.8l DAV/2 mod_auth_passthrough/2.1 FrontPage/5.0.2.2635
> X-Powered-By: PHP/5.2.11

---
This alert was generated by the Sucuri Network Integrity Monitor.

There's a nice dashboard, offering you history snapshots:



You'll also find a nice web information gathering tool called WIGS which grabs public information available about websites.

Check it ou…

Watcher: Spotting dubious webishness

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November's toolsmith features Watcher, a great passive security auditor from Chris Weber of Casaba Security, that detects web application security issues as well as operational configuration concerns. Watcher plugs neatly into Fiddler, an indispensable proxy that should be an inherent part of your web application assessment tool kit.
The toolsmitharticle covers using Watcher to detect "dubious" comments, unset HTTPOnly flags, open redirects, and bad cross domain flash policy, so I won't repeat myself here.
Watcher is also excellent for detecting likely XSS vulnerabilities, and will passively detect prospective parameters while you browse.
As an example, a visit to a site that shall remain anonymous only to those without fundamental Google skills results in Figure 1, seen by Watcher as it passively reviews a site with 37 different checks.


Figure 1

Note that Watcher spots what it declares is a potentially high severity user controllable HTML element attribute. Watcher furt…

PILOT: Production in lieu of testing (AgoraCart FAIL)

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SUBTITLE: "I won't test, and you can't make me!"
SUBSUBTITLE: "I can't test what I obviously don't understand, and don't care to."

So often code goes live (or stays live) just as defined in this post's title: production in lieu of testing.
Put this thinking together with vendor/developers who clearly don't understand security risks, and you end up with a spectacular FUBAR.
First, a rhetorical question:
Why is testing (security and QA) so often neglected, overlooked, ignored, or poorly conducted?
The answers we've all heard:
We have to get product to market, we can't waste time.
We're so resource limited, we don't have enough time and people to test properly.
Second, what happens when a vendor/developer combines bad testing practices with carelessness?
Let's use AgoraCart as an example. I reported an AgoraCart CSRF vulnerability via Secunia, that is now live with an advisory.

NOTE: I am discussing this in full detail given that…

Adito now OpenVPN ALS

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SSL-Explorer --> Adito --> OpenVPN ALS

The Adito project, discussed often here and in toolsmith, is now OpenVPN ALS.
Back on April 23rd, Francis Dinha, CEO of OpenVPN Technologies, contacted me after reading my March 2009 toolsmith article on Adito and asked about working with the project to become part of OpenVPN. I connected Francis with Adito project developer Samuli Seppanen, they reached an agreement, and Adito is now OpenVPN ALS.

Francis recently indicated that he's in the process of hiring more developers and will assign a developer specifically to the ALS project. With more QA testing and improvement, OpenVPN Technologoies will soon consider OpenVPN ALS fully stable.



Download it today, give the project feedback, and look forward to further enhancements.

Cheers.

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MIR-ROR 1.2 to debut at Digitial Crimes Consortium 2009

I'm pleased to announce that MIR-ROR 1.2 is now available.
This is noteworthy on the eve of the Digital Crimes Consortium 2009 on Microsoft campus in Redmond, WA this coming week, where I'll be discussing the The AntiMalware Lifecycle with Tareq Saade from the Microsoft Malware Protection Center (MMPC).
I'll be covering the incident response part of the life-cycle while Tareq will provide much insight on the anitvirus detection and signature creation process.
As part of my discussion on incident response in major enterprise data centers, I've included MIR-ROR, as it was created for just such a purpose. More succinctly, we use the tool we created, and I'll demonstrate specifics.
If you aren't aware of MIR-ROR: Motile Incident Response – Respond Objectively, Remediate MIR-ROR, it' a security incident response specialized, command-line script that calls specific Windows Sysinternals tools, as well as some other useful gems, to provide live capture data for inves…

Using OSSEC to monitor ModSecurity and Wordpress

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As the October ISSA Journal begins to make the rounds, readers will note OSSEC as the topic of my toolsmith column.
The topic was chosen by Doug Burks of Security Onion as part of the Pick a Toolsmith Topic contest (we'll do it again).
As a result Doug won Zero Day Threat: The Shocking Truth of How Banks and Credit Bureaus Help Cyber Crooks Steal Your Money and Identity. Thanks again, Doug.
The article is available for all readers here.

While I discussed OSSEC as it pertains to Snort logs, PCI compliance, application (misuse) monitoring and auditing, as well as malware behavioral analysis, I spent very little time discussing the use of OSSEC with ModSecurity or Wordpress.
So here's where I magically tie it all together. ;-)
Given the title of the book Doug won, what's one way we might help prevent cyber crooks from stealing our money and identity?
Monitor our web applications, of course! With OSSEC. See how I did that?

OSSEC and mod_security

As an example, on an Ubuntu server ru…

CSRF attacks and forensic analysis

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Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks exhibit an oft misunderstood yet immediate impact on the victim (not to mention the organization they work for) whose browser has just performed actions they did not intend, on behalf of the attacker.
Consider the critical infrastructure operator performing administrative actions via poorly coded web applications, who unknowingly falls victim to a spear phishing attack. The result is a CSRF-born attack utilized to create an administrative account on the vulnerable platform, granting the attacker complete control over a resource that might manage the likes of a nuclear power plant or a dam (pick your poison).

Enough of an impact statement for you?

There's another impact, generally less considered but no less important, resulting from CSRF attacks: they occur as attributable to the known good user, and in the context of an accepted browser session.
Thus, how is an investigator to fulfill her analytical duties once and if CSRF is deemed to be t…

OffVis 1.1 now available

A quick update on OffVis as September's toolsmith on the same topic begins to arrive in ISSA Journal subscriber's mailboxes.
MSRC Engineering Security Research & Defense has released OffVis 1.1, along with a detailed and insightful video (best viewed with IE) on the OLESS Office legacy binary file format.
The new release includes bug fixes, enhancements, and additional detected CVEs.
Download OffVis 1.1, watch the video, and read the article if you spend any time analyzing Office malware.
Cheers.

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Disclosure standards and why they're critical

If you've read this blog over the last couple of years you've likely made note of the varying degrees of success I've had disclosing vulnerabilities.
You've seen the best of breed in AppRiver and SmarterTools.
You've also seen lessons in how to not handle disclosures in the likes of American Express and Ameriprise. I believe Ameriprise is Pwnie-worthy for Lamest Vendor Response given that Benjamin Pratt, Ameriprise’s vice president of public communications, said "There's no one at risk here." and that there are no plans to review any of the mechanisms the company may have in place to receive notifications from the public about website vulnerabilities. Wow. The Consumerist clarified those statements aptly with "we assume he means, "No one important on our side of things. Our customers can suck it."

I take disclosure very seriously. I believe it is a deep seated, inherent responsibility that rests squarely on the shoulders of vendors and si…

toolsmith: OffVis 1.0 Beta - Office visualization tool

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My monthly toolsmith column in the September 2009 edition of the ISSA Journal features OffVis, a tool for detecting malicious Microsoft Office documents. This tool was created by MSRC's Engineering team, a group that spends a great deal of time looking for ways to detect exploitation of given vulnerabilities, in particular those that are Office-related.
Their efforts led to the creation of OffVis, starting in November 2008. First released in beta to MAPP participants, it has matured into a UI-based tool that analyzes a very specific set of vulnerabilities in order to better help defenders. MSRC Engineering’s work allows them to build detection logic, and then reuse it as part of ongoing analysis efforts.

Excerpt:
A typical targeted attack often includes an email sent to an intended victim with a malicious Excel document attached. When the victim opens the Excel document the following sequence might occur. First, it exploits a vulnerability to force Excel to run embedded shellcode. Th…

Amex II: Ameriprise mishandles disclosure too

Yet another online finance flaw for your consideration.
Remember the American Express issue?
Apparently the negligence and ignorance of the parent has been inherited by the child.
It took me pinging Dan Goodin at The Register and asking him to shake Ameriprise out of their slumber to address the most commonplace, simple, web application bug of all: XSS. Really? Still?
Dan did a bang up job of the task at hand; it was fixed within hours. Ameriprise had ignored my multiple attempts to disclose over five months. Power of the press, eh?
The story is here.
I also owe Laura Wilson at Information Security Resources for alerting me to likely issues with Ameriprise.
I'm tired of having to say it. It's even gotten to the place where readers get pissed at me because I keep stressing the point. But I shouldn't have to.
Major financial providers should not be ignoring reports of common web application vulnerabilities sent in via all their available channels.
Major financial providers should be…

Linux Magazine: Tools for Visualizing IDS Output

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The September 2009 issue (106) of Linux Magazine features a cover story I've written that I freely admit I'm very proud of. Tools for Visualizing IDS Output is an extensive, comparative study of malicious PCAPs as interpreted by the Snort IDS output versus the same PCAPs rendered by a variety of security data visualization tools. The Snort rules utilized are, of course, the quintessential ET rules from Matt Jonkman's EmergingThreats.net. This article exemplifies the power and beauty of two disciplines I've long favored: network security monitoring and security data visualization.

Excerpt:
The flood of raw data generated by intrusion detection systems (IDS) is often overwhelming for security specialists, and telltale signs of intrusion are sometimes overlooked in all the noise. Security visualization tools provide an easy, intuitive means for sorting through the dizzying data and spotting patterns that might indicate intrusion. Certain analysis and detection tools use PCA…

AppRiver: SaaS security provider sets standard for rapid response

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On July 28th I was happily catching up on my RSS feeds before getting ready to head of to Las Vegas for DEFCON when a Dark Reading headline caught my eye.
Tim Wilson's piece, After Years Of Struggle, SaaS Security Market Finally Catches Fire, drew me in for two reasons.
I'm a fan of certain SaaS Security products (SecureWorks), but I also like to pick on SaaS/cloud offerings for not shoring up their security as much as they should.
The second page of Tim's article described AppRiver, the "Messaging Experts" as one of some smaller service providers who have created a dizzying array of offerings to choose from.
That was more than enough impetus to go sniffing about, and sure enough, your basic, run-of-the-mill XSS vulnerabilities popped up almost immediately.

Before...


After...


Not likely an issue a SaaS security provider wants to leave unresolved, and here's where the story brightens up in an extraordinarily refreshing way.
If I tried, in my wildest imaginatio…

toolsmith: AIRT-Application for Incident Response Teams

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My monthly toolsmith column in the August 2009 edition of the ISSA Journal features AIRT.
"AIRT is a web-based application that has been designed and developed to support the day to day operations of a computer security incident response team. The application supports highly automated processing of incident reports and facilitates coordination of multiple incidents by a security operations center."
Kees Leune had pointed me to his excellent offering after I'd sent him MIR-ROR for his consideration.
Incident response teams will find this app very useful for case management.
The article PDF is here.
Thanks to Kees for all his time and feedback while I was writing this month's article.
Cheers.

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DEFCON 17 Presentation and Videos Now Available

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Mike and I presented CSRF: Yeah, It Still Works to a receptive DEFCON crowd, where we took specific platforms and vendors to task for failing to secure their offerings against cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks.

Dan Goodin from The Register did a nice write-up on the talk wherein he cleverly referred to some of the above mentioned as the Unholy Trinity. ;-) See if you can spot in the presentation slides why that reference is pretty funny.

For those of you who are interested in the talk but weren't able to attend, the presentation slides are here, and links to the associated videos are embedded in the appropriate slides. The videos are big AVI files so you'll be a lot happier downloading them.

I'll be following up on some very interesting questions that arose during Q&A after this talk, so stay tuned over the next few weeks for posts regarding sound token implementation, CSRF mitigation and Ruby, and the implications of CSRF attacks on forensic investigations.

Cheers…

DEFCON preview: Netgear RP614 CSRF attack video

To give you a sense of what Mike Bailey and I will be covering at defcon 17 this Saturday at 11am, I thought I'd give you a little taste courtesy of a Netgear RP614v4 router that suffers from cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerabilities, as well as persistent cross-site scripting (XSS) issues.
See OSVDB advisory 54885 for further specifics. BTW, please support OSVDB!

The short version:
The Netgear RP614v4 web-based administration interface allows users to perform certain actions via HTTP requests without performing any validity checks to verify the requests. This can be exploited to perform administrative actions or conduct script insertion attacks e.g. when a logged-in administrator visits a malicious web site.
The sad truth of the matter is this, while I don't have access to the whole Netgear product line, the reuse the same firmware codebase across multiple devices.
Thus, in all likelihood, there are numerous Netgear devices vulnerable to this issue, if not all.
The same ho…