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Showing posts from December, 2007

Storm keeps coming (4th variant)

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They just keep coming...this one is very similar to the 3rd variant we reviewed, but some changes are apparent.
1) Hash: 1f362ad74d62262bff6bcb1d078cbf7d
2) Aside from yet again changing the domain and binary, the hidden files written upon execution are as follows:

Helios Rootkit Detector
Scanning File System For Hidden Files

[*] Scanning Drive C
1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\bldy.config Hidden From API
2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\bldy3a80-61.sys Hidden From API
Execute Duration (in seconds)=18

Loaded Drivers:
Driver File Company Name Description
C:\WINDOWS\System32\bldy3a80-61.sys

Kernel31 Api Log
***** Installing Hooks *****
4012d8 CreateFileA(C:\WINDOWS\System32\bldy.config)
40117f CreateFileA(C:\WINDOWS\System32\bldy3a80-61.sys)

DirwatchData
WatchDir Initilized OK
Watching C:\WINDOWS
Created: C:\WINDOWS\system32\bldy.config
Modifed: C:\WINDOWS\system32\bldy.config
Modifed: C:\WINDOWS\system32
Created: C:\WINDOWS\system32\bldy3a80-61.sys
Modifed: C:\WINDOWS\system32\bldy3a80-61.sys

Better AV coverage a…

Holiday Storm Part 3

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I know, I know...enough already. But our Storm friends have changed the game a bit for the third round, as discussed on the ISC Diary, in particular Update 3. The changed domain and binary name led me to ponder what else has changed. So...
1) New hash: BE22F894AC662C905C37CEFDE66DE065
2) Better hiding skills, no visible running processes, nastiness all hidden from the API (can you say rootkit?). No more hanging out in the open, easily seen.
The Helios Rootkit Detector, now included in RAPIER, discovered darker voodoo than the last two versions:

Scanning File System For Hidden Files
[*] Scanning Drive C
1 C:\WINDOWS\system32\cleanmgr.exe Hidden From API
2 C:\WINDOWS\system32\clean.config Hidden From API
3 C:\WINDOWS\system32\clean6c9-3320.sys Hidden From API
4 C:\WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\cleanmgr.exe Hidden From API

SysAnalyzer says:

Loaded Drivers:
Driver File Company Name Description
C:\WINDOWS\System32\clean6c9-3320.sys

Kernel31 Api Log
***** Installing Hooks *****
4012c1 CreateFileA(C:\WINDO…

Malware analysis tools

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I've been asked to share the tools I use for malware analysis, in particular API details.
The Malcode Analysis Software Tools from iDefense Labs are extremely useful. toolsmith featured the suite in the July 2007 column.
API-Logger can be used as a standalone tool or you can run the .exe through SysAnalyzer which includes API-Logger output.
Other important pieces in my sandbox included VMWare Server (Linux host, Windows VMs), PE Explorer, RAPIER 3.2, Wireshark, Mandiant Red Curtain (MRC), and the Systinternals tools.
Check the toolsmith page for articles on Wireshark, MRC, and RAPIER use as well.
Required reading from the "The Godfather of RE", Lenny Zeltser, includes his Reverse Engineering Malware paper.

New Years Storm deja vu

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Not content to settle for all the new bot's they got for Christmas, the RBN would like to wish you a Happy New Year as well with hxxp://uhavepostcard.com/happy2008.exe.
New hash, 5bb3606d36019142507043f30401c5d2, same malware as that we received when we fell for the Christmas strip show they offered us ;-).
Again, it copies itself to C:\WINDOWS as disnisa.exe, writes the same registry keys and config file, and follows the same network attributes as mentioned in previous post, but better AV coverage now that this variant's been around for a few days:

AntiVir - Worm/Zhelatin.ob
Authentium - W32/StormWorm.P
BitDefender - Trojan.Peed.IRE
CAT-QuickHeal - (Suspicious) - DNAScan
DrWeb - Trojan.Packed.263
eSafe - Suspicious File
eTrust-Vet - Win32/Sintun.AT
F-Prot - W32/StormWorm.P
F-Secure - Packed.Win32.Tibs.gu
Kaspersky - Packed.Win32.Tibs.gu
Microsoft - Trojan:Win32/Tibs.gen!ldr
Prevx1 - Stormy:Worm-All Variants
Symantec - Trojan.Peacomm.D
Webwasher-Gateway - Worm.Zhelatin.ob

I was further intrig…

Storm-Bot stripshow analysis

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Merry Christmas from the RBN. Now on a PC near you, a stripshow from Santa's helpers. Or not.
The ISC reported the expected Storm surge Christmas eve at 0000 GMT.
hxxp://merrychristmas.com/stripshow.exe (modified to protect the innocent) yields a hash of 2BBA62FBC3B9AF85C3C7D64A82E1237C. Once executed it immediately copies itself as disnisa.exe to C:\WINDOWS and adds a startup registry key for the same.

Current AV detection includes:
Kaspersky stripshow.exe - Email-Worm.Win32.Zhelatin.pd.
eTrust-Vet - Win32/Sintun.AT
Microsoft - Trojan:Win32/Tibs.gen!ldr
Symantec - Trojan.Peacomm.D

After a quick time check to Microsoft's time server, this variant switches immediately to very noisy P2P on a variety of ports. In addition to the ISC-recommended HTTP and email blocks for outbound to merrychristmasdude.com, you have to consider if you really need outbound UDP traffic above 1024. I'm a firm believer in deny all and make exceptions only via legitimate business case. If you can achieve…

SANS Top 20 contribution

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I was very pleased to contribute to the SANS Top 20 this year, working under the tutelage of Rohit Dhamankar, and cooperatively with Adam Safier, specifically on the P2P section.
Each year this list brings value to the global information security community, I am proud to have participated, and look forward to contributing again next year.
Bruce Schneier offers some excellent commentary on it, as well. A slightly different view can be found at SearchSecurity.
Ultimately, although I speak for myself, I am quite certain that SANS intends for this list to provide the impetus to aid enterprises in the endless challenge of tightening their security posture.
Use it in good stead! Cheers.